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"OVERPAID" OLDER WORKERS AND THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Stacey Crawshaw-Lewis
Abstract: Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to
prohibit discrimination against older workers. The legislative history of the ADEA shows that
Congress recognized that this discrimination most commonly stemmed from inaccurate
stereotypes about the older worker. A review of ADEA cases decided between 1984 and 1995
demonstrates the frequent incidence of cases in which older workers allegedly were fired or
not hired because of the higher salaries typically earned by these relatively experienced
workers. This review also reveals that, applying an unduly mechanical version of the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test, courts did not effectively identify (1) employment actions
purportedly based on salary where salary served as a pretext for age animus and (2) actions in
fact based on salary but infected with illegal age stereotyping. This Comment proposes
adapting the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test to more accurately evaluate these cases.
Older workers face discrimination as applicants and as employees.1
This discrimination stems from age stereotypes and, less typically, from
animus.2 Persistent stereotypes discount the productivity and competence
of older workers.3 Studies show that older workers are, however, at least
as productive as younger workers.' Moreover, aging affects individual
1. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Report of the Secretary of Labor: Labor Market Problems of Older
Workers (noting difficulties involved in measuring age discrimination but concluding that existence
of age discrimination is accepted), in Growing Old in America 257, 270-73 (Beth B. Hess &
Elizabeth W. Markson eds., 1991); Benson Rosen & Thomas H. Jerdee, Older Employees: New
Roles for Valued Resources 35-36 (1985) (finding that managers consistently rated otherwise
identical older and younger workers differently). The number of ADEA charges filed with the EEOC
also provides some measure of the incidence of age discrimination. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
EEOC's Expanding Workload: Increases in Age Discrimination and Other Charges Call for a New
Approach 10 (1994) (reporting that the EEOC received 19,880 ADEA charges in 1993).
2. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 5
(1965) [hereinafter Secretary's Report], reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 19,22 (1981) [hereinafter Legislative History].
3. V. Jane Knox et al., The Age Group Evaluation and Description (AGED) Inventory: A New
Instrument for Assessing Stereotypes of and Attitudes Towards Age Groups, 40 Int'l J. Aging &
Hum. Dev. 31, 35, 44 (1995) (proposing new assessment tool to measure attitudes and stereotypes
about age and reporting that perceived vitality and positiveness decrease with age); Mary E. Kite &
Blair T. Johnson, Attitudes Towards Older and Younger Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 3 Psychol. &
Aging 233, 240 (1988) (finding relatively negative attitudes, particularly conceming competence,
toward older workers).
4. Glenn M. McEvoy & Wayne F. Cascio, Cumulative Evidence of the Relationship Between
Employee Age and Job Performance, 74 J. Applied Psychol. 11, 14 (1989) (concluding age and job
performance generally unrelated); David A. Waldman & Bruce J. Avolio, A Meta-Analysis of Age
Differences in Job Performance, 71 J. Applied Psychol. 33, 36 (1986) (finding widespread belief
that productivity declines with age unsupported by objective evidence). More-objective productivity
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employees differently.5 Congress passed the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) 6 in 1967 to bar employment decisions based
either on animus or these stereotypes.
7
Employment decisions based on the relatively high salaries of
older workers may mask employer animus towards older workers
or involve stereotypical assumptions about the productivity of
older workers. A review of ADEA cases decided between 1984
and 1995 demonstrates the striking number of cases in which an
older worker allegedly was fired or not hired because of salary
concerns.8 In most of these cases, however, the district court
dismissed the claim on summary judgment. This result has been
particularly evident since the U.S. Supreme Court's, decision in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.9
In Biggins, a unanimous Court both strengthened and weakened
the basis for age discrimination claims based on salary. The Court
strengthened these claims by explicitly recognizing the ADEA's
concern with age stereotyping.'0 But, by finding age and seniority
analytically distinct, the Court made age discrimination claims
based on salary more difficult to prove insofar as these claims
depend on the link between age and seniority and then between
indices show performance may increase with age (perhaps as a result of increases in experience and
judgment) whereas indices based on supervisory ratings show a small decline in performance with
age, perhaps reflecting rater bias. Id.
5. AARP, Valuing Older Workers: A Study of Costs and Productivity 34 (1995) (reporting that job
performance at all ages varies by individual more than by age group); WaldmE & Avolio, supra
note 4, at 37 (concluding that chronological age cannot account for significant differences between
individual's job performance).
6. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)). For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the ADEA, see infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (requiring that employers "promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age"); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,747 (remarks of Rep. Dent) ("The bill
recognizes two distinct types of unfair discrimination based on age: First, the discrimination which is
the result of misunderstanding of the relationship of age to usefulness; and second, the
discrimination which is a result of a deliberate disregard of a worker's value solely because of
age."); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating tiat Congress passed
ADEA due to concern "that older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes").
8. See infra note 95. For clarity, this Comment focuses on actions based on salary although salary
or wage is just one component of worker compensation. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employer Costs.for
Employee Compensation: March 1993,45 Compensation & Working Conditions 1 (1993). Salary or
wage is the largest component of compensation, representing 71.3% of total compensation. Id. at 21.
9. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
10. Id. at610-11.
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seniority and salary. The Court held that termination based on
pension status, at least where this status depended on years of
service and not directly on age, was not necessarily age-based and
instructed lower courts to look for evidence that age actually
motivated the decision."
To determine whether age "actually" motivated a decision
purportedly based on salary, courts overwhelmingly have used the
McDonnell Douglas2/Burdine3  test. Applying an unduly
mechanical version of this test, however, courts have not
rigorously reviewed employment actions based on salary for
evidence of animus or stereotyping. For example, by failing to
inquire whether employers considered wage reductions instead of
termination, whether the employer took other cost-savings steps
affecting younger workers, or whether the determination that the
plaintiff's salary was excessive conflicted with the employer's
prior evaluations, courts did not adequately explore whether the
salary justification was pretext for animus. Moreover, courts did
not explicitly consider whether stereotypical assumptions about the
productivity of older workers infected the employment decision.
Specifically, courts did not require evidence that the employer
considered salary in the context of the individual worker's
productivity. Because decisions based on salary disproportionately
target older workers and because salary decisions are inherently
vulnerable to age stereotyping, courts should require more of
employers who act on the basis of salary.
Part I of this Comment introduces the ADEA and describes the
traditional doctrinal approach to employment actions based on
salary. Part II reviews the cases, noting changes since Biggins. Part
III analyzes cases decided between 1984 and 1995 by employer
motivation, type of action, and procedural disposition. Part IV
proposes adapting the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test to better
determine whether an employment decision based on salary masks
animus or age stereotyping.
11. Id. at 611-12.
12. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
13. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-53 (1981).
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I. PROVING DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADEA
A. The ADEA and Its Ties to Title VII
The ADEA developed in the wake of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII) 4 During the floor debates preceding adoption of
Title VII, House and Senate members attempted, unsuccessfully, to
include a prohibition against age discrimination in the landmark civil
rights statute.' 5 Instead, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to
prepare a fact-finding study on the effects of such discrimination in
employment.' 6 Based on this study, Congress passed the ADEA in
1967.17
The ADEA includes some unique features. First, while the ADEA
mirrors Title VII in its prohibitions, 8 the ADEA balances these
prohibitions with numerous exceptions. 9 Potentially the most powerful
of these exceptions allows employers to take actions affecting older
workers if the action is based on "reasonable factors other than age. '20
Second, the purposes of the ADEA reflect Congress' concerns about
stereotyping that discount the productivity of older workers.2' Finally,
Congress recognized that the cost of employment benefits increases as
employees age.22 Worried that these accelerating costs would dissuade
employers from hiring older applicants, Congress allowed employers to
14. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
15. 110 Cong. Ree. 2596-99, 9911-13, 13490-92 (1964), reprinted in Legislative History, supra
note 2, at 5-14.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 83-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 287, 316 (superseded by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-261 § 10, 86 Stat. 111, 132).
17. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)).
18. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(t). The ADEA exempts decisions based on age where age is a "bona fide
occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business." § 623()(1). Moreover, the ADEA protects good-cause discharges and disciplinary
actions, bona fide seniority systems, and benefit plans. § 623(f)(2)-(3).
20. § 623(f)(1).
21. See Secretary's Report, supra note 2, at 5 (concluding that age discrimination existed but
stemmed from stereotypes about older workers rather than from animus or into erance), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 2, at 22; 113 Cong. Rec. 34,742 (remarks of Rep. Burke) ("[Age
discrimination] arises ... because of assumptions that are made about th, effects of age on
performance"), reprinted in Legislative History, .upra note 2, at 153.
22. See Terrence P. Collingsworth, Comment. The Cost Defense Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 1982 Duke L.J. 580, 584-93 (discussing ADEA legislative history regarding cost
issues).
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consider the higher costs of older workers when crafting benefit
packages.23 Thus, Congress recognized the reasonable concerns of
employers, the fact that age discrimination arises from inaccurate
stereotyping, and some of the costs associated with older workers.
B. Proving Claims of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
Under the ADEA
Because of the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, it is not
surprising that courts have used Title VII tools to examine ADEA
cases.24 To examine cases of disparate treatment 5 under either statute,
courts look first for direct evidence of intent to discriminate.26 When
such evidence is unavailable, courts use the McDonnell
Douglas27/Burdine2" burden shifting test to determine, by inference,
whether intentional discrimination has occurred. 9 Cases involving
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B) (allowing employers "to observe the terms of a bona fide employee
benefit plan where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment made or cost
incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger
worker").
24. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("There are important similarities
between the two statutes, to be sure, both in their aims--the elimination of discrimination from the
workplace-and in their substantive prohibitions. In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived
in haec verba from Title VII.").
25. "Disparate treatment occurs when an employee is treated less favorably simply because of
race, color, sex, national origin, or in our case, age. This is the most obvious form of discrimination.
To be successful on this type of claim, proof of discriminatory motive is critical." EEOC v. Francis
W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995)
26. TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing three-step, burden
shifting test to evaluate circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination).
28. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (clarifying that
second step of McDonnell Douglas test shifts burden of production to defendant to articulate
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse employment action).
29. See Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1212 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The vast majority of
cases that have discussed the appropriate burdens and standards for action under the ADEA have
adopted the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, a race discrimination case.")
(citation omitted); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311-13 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting
similarity between Title VII and ADEA and applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA case
but cautioning that framework should not be applied automatically without regard for differences
between statutes).
The U.S. Supreme Court recently noted:
In assessing claims of age discrimination brought under the ADEA, [lower courts have] applied
some variant of the basic evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. We have
never had occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA context
is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall assume it."
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employment actions based on salary are typically analyzed using this
test.30 The three-part test begins when the plaintiff meets the required
prima facie elements,3 ' eliminating the most likely non-discriminatory
reasons for the adverse employment action.32 The burden of production
then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the action. 3 Finally, the plaintiff has an opportunity to
demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual, either by
offering additional evidence of discriminatory intent or by demonstrating
that the proffered reason is false.34 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the
court may, but is not required to, find for the plaintiff as a matter of
law. 35
Although the vast majority of plaintiffs presenting age discrimination
claims based on salary charge disparate treatment," some plaintiffs have
argued successfully that facially neutral policies with a "disparate
impact" on older workers violate the ADEA.37
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their
face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another. No proof of" discriminatory
motive is necessary, but if the practice is found to be justified by
business necessity, the claim will fail.38
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
30. See, e.g., Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7fl Cir. 1994); Denison
v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1991).
31. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. For example, a prima facie demonstration that the plaintiff was qualified for the position
shows, at least preliminarily, that the plaintiff was not rejected because he or she was unqualified.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
33. Id. This burden has been a major battlezground in employment discrimination law. Compare
Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) with Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).
34. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08(1993); Burdi'ze, 450 U.S. at 256;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
35. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511; see Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment
After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229 (1995).
36. Because salary correlates with age, most courts analyze employment actions based on salary
as "disparate treatment" cases based on age, not as cases involving facially neutral polices and
practices that have a "disparate impact" on older workers. Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older
Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discimination in Employment Act, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 229,
272-73 (1990); infra note 97 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994); Geller v. Markham,
635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
38. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2577 (1995). The theory originated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII
case, and was codified as an amendment to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA), Pub. L.
Vol. 71:769, 1996
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The U.S. Supreme Court never has decided whether the ADEA covers
disparate impact claims.39 Recently, circuit courts have doubted or denied
the applicability of the disparate impact theory under the ADEA.40
II. A REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW
A. Pre-Biggins Case Law of Employment Actions Based on Salary
What roles can the costs associated with employing older workers
play under each of these theories? 4t Typically, economic considerations
drive an employer's decision to increase or reduce its work force.42 In
general, the ADEA allows these cost-based decisions. 3 After first
deciding to add to or cut its workforce, an employer must then select in a
non-discriminatory manner which particular individuals to hire or fire.'
No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). For a
thorough review of the impact of the CRA on the ADEA, see Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't
Bark, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1093 (1993).
39. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). The academic community has hotly
debated whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. Compare Pamela S. Krop,
Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 837 (1982) (arguing
that disparate impact theory is inapplicable under ADEA) and Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a
Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 267 (1995) (same) with Maria Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact
Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1038 (1984) (arguing that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under ADEA).
40. See, e.g. Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp, 48 F.3d 719, 731 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995).
41. See Collingsworth, supra note 22, at 581 (stating that ADEA cases involving costs are
contradictory); Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 88 Yale L.J. 565, 574-87 (1979) (reviewing cases decided before 1979 and noting
disagreement regarding whether higher "direct" costs of older workers constitute legitimate grounds
for discharge).
42. Michael Useem, Business Restructuring and the Aging Workforce (discussing weight of
economic factors, such as business downturns, in downsizing decisions), in Aging and Competition:
Rebuilding the U.S. Workforce 33, 35-38 (James A. Auerbach & Joyce C. Welsh eds., 1994).
43. See, e.g., Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855
(1987); Mauter v. Hardy Corp., 825 F.2d 1554 (11 th Cir. 1987); Chappell v. GTE Prods., 803 F.2d
261 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987).
44. See, e.g., Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1985). The defendant's
millshop was a losing financial proposition, so the defendant fired Tice, the employee who did the
majority of the millshop's work. Id. at 1216-17 & n. 11. The employer's financial distress was real,
and Tice's termination was consistent with this distress. Id.; see also Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F.
Supp. 250, 259 (D. Conn. 1982) ("The ADEA does not preclude a business decision such as
defendant's; it does preclude, however, using age as a criterion in realizing that legitimate business
goal.").
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At this second stage, decisions based on cost con3iderations are
problematic because of the unique manner in which an individual's
protected status under the ADEA may correlate with his or her
employment costs, such as salary.4'5
Prior to Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,46 successful plaiatiffs presented
some or all of the following evidence that an employment action based
on salary implicated the ADEA: an actual correlation between age and
salary,47 a cost motive,4" and a link between this cost motive and the
employment action.49 Also, if an employer considered the average cost of
older workers rather than the cost of a particular worker, this
differentiation ran afoul of regulations and the anti-stereo-typing intent of
the ADEA.50
A number of prominent cases allowed claims based on these general
rules. In 1980, in Geller v. Markham,5 the Second Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, finding that the school board's policy of
hiring only teachers with limited experience to save salary costs violated
the ADEA under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. 2
The court cited regulations prohibiting classification of older workers on
the basis of their higher average cost. 3 The court reasoned that the
school district's policy operated to classify and exclude older workers
45. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, How Much We Earn-Factors that M2ke a Difference, 17
Stat. Brief 1 (1995) (discussing correlation between age and earnings): Phillip L. Rones,
Employment, Earnings and Unemployment Characteristics of Older Workers (finding that career
peak earnings generally maintained until age of 65, when age group aggregates fall because older
workers work less), in The Older Worker 21, 36 (Michael E. Borus et al. eds., 1988); cf. Boyd Black,
Age and Earnings (reviewing relationship between age and salary in Britain), in A Portrait of Pay;
1970-1982, at 274 (Mary B. Gregory & Andrew W.J. Thomson eds., 1990).
46. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
47. See, e.g. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that
economic savings in form of salary and unpaid pension benefits were insufficient justifications to
terminate plaintiff, because these savings were "directly" related to plaintiff's age). Marshall's salary
was higher than the salary of her younger coworkers because she had received more seniority raises
over her longer tenure with the company. Id. at 728.
48. See, e.g., Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1208 (7th Cir. 1987).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel, 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (concluding
that ADEA regulations permitted "an employer to consider employment costs where such
consideration is predicated upon an individual as opposed to a general assessment that the older
worker's cost of employment is greater than for other workers").
51. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 1034-35. The plaintiff was a 55 year-old teacher hired for a position, but shortly
thereafter replaced by a younger woman with less experience who qualified for a lower salary. Id. at
1029-30.
53. Id. at 1033.
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because of their higher cost as a group. 4 The court then found, based on
the same reasoning, that the defendant's cost justification failed to defeat
the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim.5
In another early case, Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,56 the
Eighth Circuit found that a college's faculty selection plan based on
tenure status conflicted with the purposes of the ADEA.57 To save costs,
the college reserved a position for a non-tenured professor, eventually
selecting a non-tenured professor who scored lower in the hiring
evaluation than the plaintiff. 8 Because of the close relationship between
tenure status and age, the court concluded that the plain intent and effect
of the defendant's practice were to eliminate older workers who had built
up, through years of satisfactory service, higher salaries than their
younger counterparts.5 9 As in Geller, the court referred to administrative
guidelines barring classifications based on the average cost of older
workers as a group. 0 The Leftwich court cited Geller for the proposition
that the economic savings realized by discharging older workers do not
justify such an action under the ADEA.6'
The leading case disallowing a termination based on the plaintiffs
"'excessive" salary was Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.62 The Metz court
concluded that allowing Transit Mix to replace Metz based on the higher
cost of employing him would defeat the anti-discrimination intent of the
statute.63 The Metz court limited its holding to the particular facts of the
case, stressing that the plaintiffs salary depended directly on years of
service and that the defendant did not offer to reduce the plaintiff's
salary.' The court found that the defendant's desire to save costs was not
a permissible, nondiscriminatory reason to replace the plaintiff with a
54. Id. at 1034.
55. Id.
56. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
57. Id. at 691.
58. Id. at 689. The Board of Regents' education consultant told the plaintiff that he was a "victim
of tenure density." Id. at 690.
59. Id. at 691.
60. Id. at 691-92.
61. Id. at 692.
62. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 1205-06; see also Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co. 827 F.2d 13, 21 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding defendant's alleged reason-economic cutbacks-pretextual where defendant refused
plaintiff's offer to take another, lower paying job).
64. 828 F.2d at 1203-04.
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younger, lower-paid employee. 5 The court noted that employers set
salary levels, at least in the short run and within the parameters of the
competitive market.6 Thus, "[t]hrough its control over productivity per
wage dollar, the management would effectively decide: who could be
terminated as its employees reach a relatively advanced age."'67
Following Metz, courts entertained claims of age discrimination based
on salary.68 Courts required evidence of the correlation between age and
salary.69 For example, in Holt v. Gamewell Corp.,0 the plaintiff failed to
show that his salary was based on his age. The court noted that "the
record before us belies [the Plaintiff's age-based] explanation for the
level of his salary. It was primarily the result of promotions, merit raises
based on his excellent evaluations, and his occupying a managerial
position.' Courts also required that plaintiffs demonstrate that salary
indeed motivated the employment decision.2
Although prominent cases allowed claims of age discrimination based
on salary, not all courts have found such claims viable. The Fifth Circuit
has refused to allow plaintiffs to rely on the link between age and
seniority to find age discrimination and thus has been unreceptive to
claims of age discrimination based on salary (where the: older worker's
salary is relatively high due to years of experience).73 Other courts have
65. Id. at 1204.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1210.
68. See, e.g., Gelofv. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912 (D. Del. 1986) (finding for older worker fired
because his salary exceeded that available in defendant's reorganized budget and citing Geller,
Leftwich, Arlene Knitwear, and other leading cases for proposition that salary discrimination is age
discrimination), vacated in part, 829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987); Wing v. Iowa Lutheran Hosp., 426
N.W.2d 175, 180 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (citing Leftwich for proposition thai "[e]conomic savings
derived from discharging older employees cannot serve as a legitimate justification under the
ADEA").
69. See, e.g., Gray v. York Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070, 1087 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissing
plaintiff's salary-based argument because replacement worker with less seniority was not
significantly younger than plaintiff).
70. 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 38.
72. See Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming
jury verdict based on evidence that employer considered cost of older workers in choosing which
workers to retain); Branson v. Price River Coal, 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986) (noting
inconclusive figures regarding cost savings realized by discharging older workers and concluding
that theory based on these savings mere speculation), afd, 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988).
73. See Hamilton v. Grocers Supply, 986 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to follow Metz),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 77 (1993); Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1991) (affirming summary judgment for defendant and finding plaintiff's assertions that he was fired
on basis of his seniority irrelevant to age discrimination claim); Williams v. General Motors, 656
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shown similar discomfort with such claims.74 Thus, despite the
prominence of cases such as Metz, Leftwich, and Geller, plaintiffs
charging age discrimination based on salary have encountered a
decidedly mixed reception. The U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved
this split but considered the closely related issue of employment actions
based on pension status in Biggins.
B. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins75
Before the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether an employment
action based on pension status violated the ADEA in Biggins,76 lower
courts generally held that firing workers based on pension status would
violate the statute." Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reiterated
that Congress passed the ADEA to protect older workers from adverse
employment action on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes and that "[ilt is the very essence of age discrimination for an
employee to be fired because the employer believes that productivity and
competence decline with old age."78 Reasoning that age and pension
status are analytically distinct, Justice O'Connor found, however, that the
action was not necessarily age-based79 and that liability depended on
whether age "actually" motivated the employment decision.8" For
example, employers using an age-correlated characteristic to "target"
older employees, employers dually motivated by age and the correlated
F.2d 120, 130 n.17 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ('Seniority and age discrimination are unrelated."), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
74. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984) (allowing cost justifications that
meet two-part test that considers necessity of drastic cost reductions and less detrimental, alternative
measures); Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (finding
defendant's "desire to save $I0 per in salary for the... position is clearly a sound business reason,"
and stating that "natural aging process in any work force" prevents all but limited inference from fact
of replacement by younger, cheaper worker). But see Lenz v. Erdmann Corp., 773 F.2d 62 (6th Cir.
1985) (reversing summary judgment on evidence that employer in financial difficulty attempted to
terminate older, higher paid employees and other evidence of pretext).
75. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
76. Id. at610.
77. See Reyher v. Champion Int'l, 975 F.2d 483, 487 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that jury could
reasonably infer that plaintiffs demotion was motivated by employer's discriminatory desire to
reduce pension costs by firing and demoting older workers); White v. Westinghouse Elec., 862 F.2d
56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment for employer and remanding case to consider
whether Westinghouse timed discharge to avoid paying additional pension benefits).
78. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610.
79. Specifically, the action at issue was a termination based on pension status calculated
according to years of service. Id. at 611.
80. Id.
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factor, and employers acting on the basis of factors that depend directly
upon age, violate the ADEA.8" Thus, Biggins instructed that decisions
infected by age stereotyping violated the ADEA and that decisions based
on factors that correlated with age may be, but are not necessarily, age-
based.
C. Post-Biggins Cases
Although Biggins concerned employment actions based on pension
status, lower courts have applied its holding to actions based on other
factors that correlate with age, such as salary. 2 In Anderson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp.,83 the Seventh Circuit concluded that Biggins
vindicated the dissent in Metz, which had contended that "wage
discrimination is age discrimination only when wage depends directly on
age, so that the use for one is a pretext for the other; high covariance is
not sufficient."84 In a companion decision, EEOC v. Francis W. Parker
School,85 the Seventh Circuit also extended the reach of Biggins to
disallow a disparate impact claim based on salary.86 The Parker School
decision presented a particularly sharp contrast to the earlier Metz
decision. While the Metz court found that the fact that the defendant did
not offer a reduced salary undermined the validity of its salary
rationale,87 the Parker School court ignored the fact that the defendant
declined the plaintiffs offer to work for a lower salary.8
Other post-Biggins cases have demonstrated increased resistance to
claims of age discrimination based on salary.89 For example, in
81. Id.
82. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
83. 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
84. Id. at 1126 (quoting Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1212 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
85. 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994).
86. Id. at 1076 (rejecting plaintiff's age discimination claims based on theofies of both disparate
treatment and disparate impact). The court cited Biggins, finding the Supreme Court's reasoning
applicable to disparate impact cases, too. Id. at 1076-78.
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text
88. 41 F.3d at 1078 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
89. See Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant and holding that evidence that defendant terminated plaintiff to save salary
costs does not support inference of age discrimination); Woroski v. Nashua Coip., 31 F.3d 105, 110
n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The ADEA does not prohibit an employer from acting, out of concern for
excessive costs, even if they arise from age-related facts-such as that employees with long seniority
command a higher salary... "); Tipsword v. Oglivy & Mather, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment and finding that defendant's desire to
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Pagliarini v. General Instrument Corp.,9" a First Circuit lower court
announced a new, post-Biggins rule.9 The court found that the
replacement was of roughly the same age as the plaintiff, so age and
salary were not correlated; but the court stated that even if the
replacement worker was younger and lower paid this would do nothing
to advance the plaintiff's case.92 Citing Biggins, the court concluded that
because age and compensation level are analytically distinct, evidence
that the decision was based on compensation level is not evidence of
discrimination.93 Likewise, another lower court stated that "firing... an
employee to save salary costs resulting from seniority ...does not
violate the ADEA" as a matter of law.94
III. ANALYSIS OF AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES BY TYPE OF
CLAIM, PROCEDURAL DISPOSITION, AND EMPLOYER
MOTIVE
A. Typically Plaintiffs Charged Disparate Treatment After a
Discharge Allegedly Based on Salary
A surprisingly large number of age discrimination decisions include
arguments or evidence that the employment action was based on salary
concerns. Sixty-six age discrimination cases reported between 1984 and
1995 include evidence of, or arguments that, the higher salary of older
workers, wholly or in part, resulted in the adverse employment action at
issue.95 The sheer number of cases involving highly paid older workers
save relatively high salary costs of the plaintiff whose responsibilities could be handled by
subordinates sufficient). But see Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow reasonable fact finder to find that age
discrimination motivated decision to discharge plaintiff rather than younger, lower paid employee).
90. 855 F. Supp. 459 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1484 (1st Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 462.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Shibursky v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169, 1177 (D. Minn. 1993); accord Slathar v. Sather
Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 1996); Phillips v. Lehigh Valley Ass'n of Rehabilitation
Ctrs., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1676, 1680 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that, as matter of law, the
ADEA precludes claims based on salary since Biggins disaffirmed Metz).
95. Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 65 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 1995); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31
F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1104 (1995); Serben v. Inter-City Mfg., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1402 (1995); Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 175
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(1993); DiCola v. Swissre Holding, 996 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1993); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997
F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993); Doyne v. Union Elec., 953 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1S92); Gray v. York
Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.
1992); Bay v. Times Mirror Magazine, 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991); Rivas v. Federacion de
Asociaciones Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814 (1st Cir. 1991); Denison v. Swaco Geololraph Co., 941 F.2d
1416 (10th Cir. 1991); Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Montana v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1989); Walker v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 881 F.2d
554 (8th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989); Bruno
v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); EEOC v.
Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1988); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987);
Reynolds v. C.L.P. Corp., 812 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1987); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec., 832 F.2d
258 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Gray v. New England TrI. & Tel., 792 F.2d
251 (1st Cir. 1986); Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 795 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986); Holt v.
Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.
1985); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985); Lenz v. Erdmann Corp., 773 F.2d 62
(6th Cir. 1985); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984);
Phillips v. Lehigh Valley Ass'n of Rehabilitation Ctrs., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1676 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd,
32 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1994); Nabat v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 64 Fair Empl. Pra. Cas. (BNA) 1774
(N.D. I1 1993), afj]d, 45 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 61 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 967 (N.D. II 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
2577 (1995), Schibursky v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Minn. 1993); Meeker v. Unisys Corp., 65
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 950 (N.D. Ga. 1993), vacated and appeal dismif'sed, 65 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1344 (11th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. MCI Int'l Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1993);
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (D. Mass. 1992), aft'd, 985 F.2d
1113 (1st Cir. 1993); Nerenstone v. Barr, 784 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1992); Frankina v. First Nat'l
Bank, 801 F. Supp. 875 (D. Mass. 1992), afPd, 991 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1993); Florkowski v. First Pa.
Bank, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1536 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Pagliarini v. General Instrument Corp.,
855 F. Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1991); Whitten v. Farmland Indus., 759 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan. 1991);
Nelson v. Kennicott Bros., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 187 (E.D. Wis. 1990), af/d, 951 F.2d
352 (7th Cir. 1991); Bedow v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 755 F. Supp. 276 (D. Ariz. 1989); Murray v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ohio 1989); Kilgore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722
F. Supp. 1535 (N.D. I11 1989); Buttell v. American Podiatric Medical Ass'n, 700 F. Supp. 592
(D.D.C. 1988); Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322 (D. Con. 1988); Wilson v.
Popp Yam Corp., 680 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Latimore v. President, 669 F. Supp. 1345
(W.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd in part, 856 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1988); Poklitar v. CBS, 652 F. Supp. 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Schweizer v. Strippit/Di-Arco-Houdaille, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1894
(W.D.N.Y. 1987); Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Long v. First
Family Fin. Servs., 677 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D. Ga. 1987); Branson v. Price Rivr Coal Co., 627 F.
Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986); Metz v. Transit Mix Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ind. 1986), rev'd, 828
F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987); Gelof v. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912 (D. Del. 1986); Husbands v. Econo
Therm Energy Sys., 650 F. Supp. 294 (D. Minn. 1986); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 620 F.
Supp. 696 (E.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.,
613 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd, 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052
(1987); Mantione v. Ted Bates Advertising, 38 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Garig v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Tex. 1985), afd, 792 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1986);
Cope v. McPherson, 594 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1984), affd, 781 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods, 622 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. II. 1984); Lomtardo v. Columbia
Dentoform Corp., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Pfeifer v. Lever Bros., 693
F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1987), afd, 850 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1988).
All cases reported in the Fair Employment Practice (BNA) volumes 35--66 were reviewed. Cases
decided by a U.S. district or circuit court in which either the plaintiff or the defendant introduced
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who alleged that they were fired or not hired because of their salary
argue for close examination of the issue. Either the problem is pervasive
or plaintiffs widely share a misconception about the basis for their
adverse employment action.
These sixty-six decisions typically involved a discharge action
scrutinized for evidence of intentional discrimination. Eighty-two percent
of the plaintiffs alleged discriminatory discharges, seventeen percent
charged discrimination based on failure to hire or rehire, and the
remainder charged other discriminatory practices.9 6 Almost all of the
evidence of, or argued that, an older worker was subjected to an adverse employment action because
of salary concerns were included in the count. Cases decided by state courts were not included.
96. The following 54 cases involved terminations: Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 65 F.3d 170
(7th Cir. 1995); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994); Serben v. Inter-City Mfg., 36
F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1402 (1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444
(8th Cir. 1993); Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 175
(1993); DiCola v. Swissre Holding, 996 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955
F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992); Doyne v. Union Elec., 953 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1992); Gray v. York
Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992); Bay v. Times Mirror Magazine, 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1991); Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991); Montana v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1989); Walker v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 881 F.2d 554 (8th
Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1988); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec., 832
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387
(4th Cir. 1987); Reynolds v. C.L.P. Corp., 812 F.2d 671 (1 Ith Cir. 1987); Gray v. New England Tel.
& Tel., 792 F.2d 251 (Ist Cir. 1986); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); Bonura
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 795 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161 (8th
Cir. 1985); Lenz v. Erdmann Corp., 773 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1985); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761
F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1985); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.
1984); Phillips v. Lehigh Valley Ass'n of Rehabilitation Ctrs., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1676
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Schibursky v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Minn. 1993); EEOC v. MCI Int'l Inc.,
829 F. Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1993); Meeker v. Unisys Corp., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 950
(N.D. Ga. 1993), vacated and appeal dismissed, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1344 (11 th Cir.
1994); Nabat v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1774 (N.D. I11 1993), affd,
45 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1995); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395 (E.D.
Pa. 1993), rev'd, 32 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1994); Frankina v. First Nat'l Bank, 801 F. Supp. 875 (D.
Mass. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1993); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 204 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1993); Pagliarini v. General
Instrument Corp., 855 F. Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1991); Nelson v. Kennicott Bros., 58 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 187 (E.D. Wis. 1990), afJ'd, 951 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991); Bedow v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
755 F. Supp. 276 (D. Ariz. 1989); Kilgore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1535 (N.D. II
1989); Buttell v. American Podiatric Medical Ass'n, 700 F. Supp. 592 (D.D.C. 1988); Wilson v.
Popp Yam Corp., 680 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Poklitar v. CBS, 652 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Long v. First Family Fin. Servs., 677 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D. Ga. 1987); Schweizer v.
Strippit/Di-Arco-Houdaille, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1894 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Branson v.
Price River Coal Co., 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986); Gelof v. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912 (D.
Del. 1986); Husbands v. Econo Therm Energy Sys., 650 F. Supp. 294 (D. Minn. 1986); Metz v.
Transit Mix Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ind. 1986), rev'd, 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987);
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1 156 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd, 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Garig v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Tex.
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cases presented disparate treatment claims.97  Specifically, courts
analyzed the cases using the McDonnell Douglas/BUrdine burden
shifting test for circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.98
Generally courts reviewed the argument that the action was based on the
older worker's higher salary during the third step99 of the "minuet."'"
Thus, courts considered whether the salary justification was pretext for
intentional age discrimination.
B. Procedural Disposition
Despite the prominence of early cases such as Metz,'0 ' Leftwich,102 and
Geller"0 3 in which plaintiffs successfully argued ADEA violations based
1985), affd, 792 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1986); Mantione v. Ted Bates Advertising. 38 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 620 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Wis.
1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987); Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods, 622 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Lombardo v. Columbia Dentoform Corp., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Pfeifer v. Lever Bros., 693 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 6:39 (4th Cir. 1988).
The following 11 cases involved disputes over hiring or rehiring decisions: Bolton v. Scrivner,
Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994) (charging discriminatory discharge and failure to rehire), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995); Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814 (1st
Cir. 1991); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062
(1990); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Sperry
Corp., 852 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1988) (involving discharge and failure to rehire decisions); Nabat v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1774 (N.D. II1 993) (concerning discharge
and failure to rehire charges), affd, 45 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch.,
61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 967 (N.D. I11 1993), affd, 41 F.3d 1073 ('Ith Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); Nerenstone v. Barr, 784 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1992); Whitten v.
Farmland Indus., 759 F. Supp. 1522 (D. Kan. 1991); Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F.
Supp. 322 (D. Conn. 1988); Kaczorv. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
97. But see EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 967 (reviewing
charges under both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2577 (1995); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 3,5 (1st Cir. 1986).
98. But see, e.g., Serben v. Inter-City Mfg., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1402 (1995); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993); Doyn! v. Union Elec., 953
F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1992); Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814 (1st Cir.
1991); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989). Gilliam v. Armtex,
Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987).
99. The plaintiffpresented a prima facie case, the defendant rebutted this charge with a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the action, and then the plaintiff introduced the sa ary-age argument in
an attempt to expose the defendant's reason as pretext for discrimination. In a number of cases, the
court reviewed this evidence as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Generlly, this occurred in
reduction-in-force (RIF) cases in which courts require additional evidence of age discrimination as
an element of the prima facie case, instead of the more typical requirement of evidence of
replacement (by a younger worker) in non-RIF cases.
100. The term "minuet" has been used to describe the carefully choreographed, burden-shifting
steps of McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine test. Malamud, supra note 35, at 2232 & r.16.
101. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
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on salary, most recent plaintiffs have failed with this argument. A review
of ADEA cases decided between 1984 and 1995 revealed that defendants
consistently won cases in which either the defendant or plaintiff
introduced evidence of, or argued that, the employment action was based
on the higher salary of an older worker." In lower court dispositions,
defendants won on summary judgment thirty times.' 5 In addition, lower
courts entered eight judgments as a matter of law (JMAL) and six
judgments after bench trial for the defendant. 0 6 In contrast, courts
102. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
103. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. Defendants won 47 of 66 cases listed supra note 95.
105. Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 65 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 1995); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31
F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 1994); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1104 (1995); DiCola v. Swissre Holding, 996 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Clay Printing
Co., 955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992); Gray v. York Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992); Bay v.
Times Mirror Magazine, 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991); Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones
Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814 (1st Cir. 1991); Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515 (11 th Cir.
1990); Montana v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1989); Holt v. Gamewell Corp.,
797 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1986); Lenz v. Erdmann Corp., 773 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Lehigh
Valley Ass'n of Rehabilitation Ctrs., 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1676 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 395 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 32 F.3d
768 (3d Cir. 1994); Nabat v. Aetna Casualty & Sur., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1774 (N.D. Ill
1993), afrd, 45 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1995); Schibursky v. IBM, 820 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Minn. 1993);
Meeker v. Unisys Corp., 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 950 (N.D. Ga. 1993), vacated and appeal
dismissed, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1344 (1 1th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. MCI Int'l Inc., 829 F.
Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1993); Frankina v. First Nat'l Bank, 801 F. Supp. 875 (D. Mass. 1992), affd,
991 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1993); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (D.
Mass. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1113 (1st Cir. 1993); Pagliarini v. General Instrument Corp., 855 F.
Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1991); Nelson v. Kennicott Bros., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 187 (E.D.
Wis. 1990), affid, 951 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991); Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1500
(N.D. Ohio 1989); Kilgore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1535 (N.D. II1 1989); Bedow v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 755 F. Supp. 276 (D. Ariz. 1989); Wilson v. Popp Yam Corp., 680 F. Supp. 208
(W.D.N.C. 1988); Schweizer v. Strippit/Di-Arco-Houdaille, 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1894
(W.D.N.Y. 1987); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986); Husbands v.
Econo Therm Energy Sys., 650 F. Supp. 294 (D. Minn. 1986); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 613
F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd, 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987);
Mantione v. Ted Bates Advertising, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Pfeifer
v. Lever Bros., 693 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1988).
These results may correspond with a more general, yet likewise pronounced, increase in the use of
summary judgment in ADEA and other contexts. See Robert J. Gregory, There is Life in That Old (I
Mean More Senior) Dog Yet: The Age Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 Hofstra
Lab. L.J. 391, 425 (1994) (discussing "near-explosion in the use of summary judgment").
106. Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir.) (judgment notwithstanding verdict
(JNOV) for defendant, voiding jury verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 175 (1993); EEOC
v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989) (judgment on verdict for defendant);
Walker v. St. Anthony's Medical Ctr., 881 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1989) (judgment on verdict for
defendant); Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec., 832 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1987) (voiding jury verdict for
plaintiff with JNOV for defendant), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Gray v. New England Tel. &
Telegraph, 792 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1986) (JMAL for defendant); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761
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entered no summary judgments or JMALs for plaintiffs3, but entered
twelve judgments for the plaintiff.' °7 most following juiy verdicts. In
sum, two-thirds of the cases resulted in rulings for the defendant.
Appellate courts affirmed seventeen of twenty-three decisions in favor of
defendants, and six of ten decisions for plaintiffs--ratios maintaining the
defendants' advantage."0 8 Determining the specific shortcomings of the
plaintiffs' cases requires an examination of each peirticular case.
Nonetheless, the pattern of the cases demonstrates the difficulties faced
by plaintiffs who claimed age discrimination on the basis of their
relatively high salaries.
F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1985) (JNOV for defendant); LaMontagne v. American Convenience Prod., 750
F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984) (JNOV for defendant); Nerenstone v. Barr, 784 F. Supp. 912 (D.D.C.
1992) (judgment for defendant after bench trial); Florkowski v. First Pa. Bank, 57 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1536 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (JMAL for defendant); Latimore v. President, 669 F. Supp. 1345
(W.D.N.C. 1987) (JMAL for defendant), affd in part, 856 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1988); Metz v. Transit
Mix Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. I11 1986), rev'd, 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (judgment for
defendant); Garig v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (judgment for defendant),
affd, 792 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1986); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 620 F. Supp. 696 (E.D.
Wis. 1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987) (voiding verdict for plaintiff with JNOV for
defendant); Cope v. McPherson, 594 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1984) (judgment for defendant after
bench trial), aff'd, 781 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
107. Serben v. Inter-City Mfg., 36 F.3d 765 (8ch Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1402 (1995);
Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993); Doyne v. Union Elec., 953 F.2d 447
(8th Cir. 1992); Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991); Bruno v. W.B.
Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); EEOC v. Sperry
Corp., 852 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1988); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1987);
Reynolds v. C.L.P. Corp., 812 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1987); Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 795
F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986); Gelofv. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912 (D. Del. 1986); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg.,
771 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1985); Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441 (W.D N.Y. 1987).
108. Affirming dispositions in favor of the defendant: Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc.. 36 F.3d 939 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995); DiCola v. Swissre Holding, 996 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1993); Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 175
(1993); Gray v. York Newspapers, 957 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1992); Rivas v. Federacion de
Asociaciones Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814 (Ist Cir. 1991); Bay v. Times Mirror Magazine, 936 F.2d 112
(2d Cir. 1991); Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker v. St.
Anthony's Medical Ctr., 881 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Atlantic Community Sch. Dist., 879
F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1989); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel., 792 F.2d 251 (1st Cir. 1986); Holt v.
Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36 (Ist Cir. 1986); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir.
1985); La Montagne v. American Convenience Prod., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984); Goldman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 204 (D. Mass. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1113 (1 st Cir.
1993).
Affirming pro-plaintiff dispositions: Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993);
Doyne v. Union Elec., 953 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1992); Denison v. Swaco Geolog-aph Co., 941 F.2d
1416 (10th Cir. 1991); Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1062 (1990); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987); Reynolds v. C.L.P. Corp.,
812 F.2d 671 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 795 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986);
Reynolds v. C.L.P. Corp., 812 F.2d 671 (11 th Cir. 1987).
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C. Employer Motive
Very few cases included direct evidence of age animus."0 9 Rather,
more cases included evidence that salary motivated the decision,"'
including employer comments such as "[we could] hire two for the price
of one,""' "[we] cannot afford to keep people over 50 and 50" (referring
to older workers earning over fifty thousand dollars per year),"2 and "I'm
just losing too much money.""'3 Less direct evidence included the salary-
reduction policy, a showing of the correlation between age and salary,
and evidence linking the policy to the adverse employment decision. In
failure to hire cases, the employer sometimes responded to an external
constraint, but more often the plaintiff's assigned starting salary was
discretionary.''
4
Few opinions seriously tested the salary justification to determine
whether the justification was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment action or whether the justification was pretext for
another reason. The opinions did not consider other cost-cutting options,
the extent to which employers control salary levels, and the fact that
wages represent, at least loosely, employer evaluations of employee
worth.
First, the opinions seldom noted either the presence or absence of
evidence that the employer considered a wage reduction in lieu of
termination despite the Metz court's discussion of the importance of such
evidence."' Even fewer opinions included evidence that the court had
109. See, e.g., Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993); Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944-45 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that age-related comments by
plaintiff's supervisor, including calling plaintiff "old fart," did not raise inference of pretext), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
110. See, e.g., Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting existence of cost
cutting policy plus statements by general manager regarding dissatisfaction with older workers who
received high salaries and generous benefits); Buttell v. American Podiatric Medical Ass'n, 700 F.
Supp. 592, 597 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding documentation of defendant's saving as result of termination
and evidence that this documentation was altered); see also Pfeifer v. Lever Bros. Co., 693 F. Supp.
358 (D. Md. 1987) (identifying cost savings as most common reason underlying age discrimination),
afi'd, 850 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1988).
I11. Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441,445 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
112. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 775 (3d Cir. 1994).
113. Wilson v. Popp Yam Corp., 680 F. Supp. 208,212 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
114. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2577 (1995); Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322,326 (D. Conn. 1988).
115. But see, e.g., Doyne v. Union Elec., 953 F.2d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[The only
alternative given to [plaintiff] was retirement"); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1203-04
(7th Cir. 1987); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987).
Washington Law Review
asked the employer: "Why not?"'1 6 In other words, why did employers
concerned with costs fail to explore retaining experienced workers at a
lower cost? The opinions also generally failed to consider whether the
employer took other cost-savings steps affecting yotunger workers.
Employers faced with cost pressures, but who only consider cost-cutting
actions that affect older workers should be required to refute the
discriminatory implication.
Second, courts seemingly ignored Metz' observation that salaries fall
largely within an employer's control. An employer who granted
discretionary raises and shortly thereafter terminated workers with
relatively high salaries should not be allowed to merely cite cost
concerns as a non-discriminatory justification. If an employer elected to
pay a premium to women workers to cover costs of cab fare, attended
parking, and other security precautions, but then ternrinated women
workers to save the costs of these premiums, courts would rightly view
the cost-cutting justification skeptically. A justification so easily
manipulated by the defendant does not warrant the courts' usual
deference to business decisions.
Finally, salaries reflect, at least loosely, the employer's evaluation of
an employee's worth. The fact that an employer initially set the salary
level should raise a presumption that this salary level reflected the
employer's evaluation of the employee's productivity. A later
determination that this salary was "excessive" should not, therefore,
enjoy the typical deference afforded to employer evaluations. 7 In the
opinions reviewed, however, courts did not require evidence that the
plaintiff s "worth" changed. Moreover, evidence of the plaintiffs' current
productivity, when offered, lacked specificity and assurances of
objectivity. For example, defendants explained that the plaintiff's were
116. DiCola v. Swissre Holding, 996 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1993) (accepting without further
questioning that higher salary no longer "economically justifiable"); Diamantopulos, 683 F. Supp. at
326 (noting that defendant was not aware of the plaintiff's willingness to accept available salary
when he interviewed for position and concluding, without further analysis, that "[d]efendant's failure
to inquire as to whether the plaintiff would accept the position at that salary cannot be said to be
unreasonable"). In cases in which the plaintiff lad forced the issue by unilaterally offering to work
for less, this evidence was not consistently held to undercut the employer's salary justification. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2577 (1995); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co. 827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987).
117. The employer should be required to present evidence to explain this shift. For example,
evidence of market changes, changes in job requirements, or altered employer goals could counter
this presumption.
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"not meeting expectations" 118 or were "over-qualified."' 9 By accepting a
salary justification without considering wage reduction evidence,
evidence of other cost-cutting measures, or evidence of the relationship
between the plaintiff's salary and productivity, courts accepted a
justification that was insufficient as a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employment action.
Although Biggins stressed the ADEA's goal of prohibiting decisions
based on stereotypes about older workers,'20 cases involving claims of
age discrimination based on salary generally did not include any analysis
of whether age stereotyping played a role in the employment action.
Empirical research confirms that employers often do not have accurate
information regarding the productivity of individual workers. 2 ' Without
objective information, employers cannot accurately consider a worker's
productivity when determining that the worker is overpaid. Rather, the
employer looks only at salary level and, perhaps, compares this salary
level to market rates. The comparison between the individual worker's
salary and his or her productivity is unstated and susceptible to the
influence of pervasive age stereotypes that discount productivity.
A Second Circuit case, Bay v. Times Mirror,2 ' provides an example of
the dangers of stereotyping inherent in salary-based decisions about older
workers. The Second Circuit allowed a termination based on salary,
reasoning with unusual care that the defendant made an individualized
decision by comparing the plaintiffs salary to market rates. 23 A fuller
consideration of the salary to productivity ratio of an older worker is not,
however, an analysis of the relationship between the components. The
plaintiff's productivity may exceed or lag behind that of the workers
118. Early v. Bankers Life & Casualty, 65 F.3d 170 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Robert H. Faley et
al., Age Discrimination and Personnel Psychology: A Review of the Legal Literature with
Implications for Future Research, 37 Personnel Psychol. 327, 342 (1984) (questioning business
sense of decision to retain lower over higher paid employees without consideration of their work
performance where such decision could result in inferior work force).
119. Pagliarini v. General Instrument Corp., 855 F. Supp. 459, 464 (D. Mass. 1991); Murray v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1989). Whether over-qualification can
ever constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employment action is debatable. See
Taggart v. Time, 924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that reasonable juror could infer age
discrimination from defendant's proffered reason of over-qualification); EEOC v. District of
Columbia Dep't of Human Servs., 729 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Indeed, the very term
'over qualified and over specialized' is almost a buzzword for 'too old."'), vacated, 925 F.2d 488
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
120. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-I 1 (1993).
121. AARP, supra note 5, at 33.
122. 936 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 117.
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earning the market rate. An employer that does not explicitly consider
the individual worker's productivity risks incorporating stereotypes
about the productivity of the older worker into any assessment of
whether the worker is "overpaid."
IV. PROPOSALS
When an employer fires or refuses to hire an older worker because of
salary concerns, this decision may violate the ADEA if the decision is (a)
actually motivated by age animus or (b) infected by illegal age
stereotyping. 24 The traditional doctrinal framework, namely the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test, is potentially adequate for the task of
identifying decisions actually motivated by age animus. However, the
current doctrinal framework does not allow courts to accurately
determine which decisions based on salary fall into the second forbidden
category.
This Comment proposes two modifications to address this failing. A
salary-based justification should not constitute a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason in the face of evidence that the employer did not
consider wage reductions or other cost-cutting measures instead of
terminations and did not consider productivity losses when calculating
salary savings. However, this modification alone will not unmask age
stereotyping. Courts should require that employers counter claims of age
discrimination based on salary with the affirmative: defense of a
reasonable factor other than age (FOTA).
A. View Wage Reduction Evidence as Pretext Evidence
Employment actions based on age animus are adequately analyzed
using the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden shifting test
only if the test is rigorously applied. Evidence that the employer did not
offer a reduced wage to the plaintiff in place of termination and refused
to consider all applicants willing to work for the available salary
regardless of "over-experience" should be considered evidence of
pretext.125 For those employers who did not take these steps, the question
124. See supra note 7.
125. See Peter H. Harris, Age Discrimination, Wages and Economics: What Judicial Standard, 13
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 715, 756 (1990) ("[O]lder workers must be given a 'right of first refusal' on
their jobs at the level of compensation determined by economic consideations... so long as their
jobs continue to exist and they are qualified to perform them."); Note, supra note 41, at 588-92
(recommending that employers be required to prove substantial cost burden and consider wage
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remains: "Why not?" This unresolved question undercuts the validity of
the salary justification. Although some courts have considered such
evidence of pretext,"2 6 the vast majority have not.
Critics of proposals to ask employers why they did not offer a wage
reduction in lieu of termination, or in failure to hire cases, why they did
not consider all applicants willing to work for the salary available, may
present the following arguments. First, the practical result for older
workers may be a trade of salary for security, a poor consolation for
older workers who feel pressured into accepting lower salaries than
younger workers of comparable productivity could command. Some
older workers will decline the offer, but others undoubtedly will accept,
as demonstrated by cases in which plaintiffs extended the offer to work
for less.'27 Second, employers cannot engage in wage reduction
negotiations with represented workers under most collective bargaining
agreements."8 Thus, the alternative is not always a viable option for
employers. However, because the overwhelming share of workers are not
represented, the alternative will typically be available to employers.
Third, a seldom cited section of the ADEA seems to prohibit wage
reductions.'29 However, limited case law suggests that this section does
not prohibit the type of reductions proposed. 3' Fourth, employers have
reductions, or other less detrimental alternatives, before discharging older workers with high "direct"
costs).
126. Gilliam v. Armtex Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co.
827 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1987); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1987).
127. Serben v. Inter-City Mfg., 36 F.3d 765 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1402 (1995);
EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal 1995).
128. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members in 1994 (Feb. 8, 1995) ("About 16.7 million wage and
salary employees, 15.5 percent of total employment, were union members in 1994.") (on file with the
Washington Lmv Review).
129. "It shall be unlawful for an employer... to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to
comply with this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
130. Rivas v. Federacion de Asociaciones Pecurarias, 929 F.2d 814, 820 (Ist Cir. 1991)
("[P]laintiffs' unwillingness to accept the decrease [in pay], even if motivated by their status as older
and more experienced workers and an expectation of earning their former union wages for the exact
same work, does not translate into age discrimination."). In Green v. Edward J. Bettinger Co., 608 F.
Supp. 35,42 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1069 (1987),
the court stated:
The employer's justification for the [wage reductionl-to maintain an appropriate relationship
between Plaintiff's compensation and the results of her efforts, to rationalize the compensation
schedule in light of the changed circumstances, to preserve the morale of similarly situated
employees, and to head off a potential undeserved, windfall for Plaintiff, is eminently
reasonable.
Id.
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argued that wage reductions dampen employee morale' but offer no
evidence that terminations achieve improved results. 132 Fifth, in failure to
hire cases, employers argue that "overqualified" workers will leave the
position as soon as a position matching their qualifications becomes
available. This argument overestimates the opportunities available to
older workers. The older applicant who accepts a reduced salary has
calculated that the job market will not pay for his or her experience.
Finally, employers may voice concern about experienced workers in
entry level or other positions reporting to less experienced supervisors.
All of these concerns lose force when we consider what the employer
who is able to implement the strategy receives as a result of the wage or
starting salary reduction: an increase in work force experience and a
decrease in payroll. A court considered this result and stated that "[t]he
worst result that could befall [the employer] would be a savings of
thousands of dollars a year... as a result of the pay reduction Plaintiff
would probably have to take to obtain an entry level legal position."' 33
Even if an employer offered wage reductions or considered all
applicants available for the starting salary, thus supporting the validity of
the salary justification, the employment action nonetheless might violate
the ADEA. 34 A rigorous application of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
test would require that employers who proffer a salary justification for an
employment action against an older worker demonstrate that this
decision included an objective comparison of the individual worker's
productivity to his or her salary.'35 Moreover, if the salary justification
contradicts the employer's prior evaluations of the employee's worth, the
employer should be required to offer an explanation for this disparity.
If the employer objectively calculated the productivity of the plaintiff
in setting the reduced wage, then there is little danger that the action
involved stereotypes about older workers as a group;3 6 however, courts
131. Binder v. Long Island Lighting, 933 F.2d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1991).
132. See Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing impact of
terminations because of pension status and notng that "[t]his is a shortsighted strategy, because it
creates ill will among employees and forces tha employer to pay new employees more in order to
compensate them for the risk of falling victim to the strategy").
133. Nerenstone v. Barr, 784 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D.D.C. 1992).
134. See Marshall v. Pyramid Life Ins., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1398 (D. Kan. 1990)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on ADEA wage-discrimiration claim; plaintiff
paid less than other regional secretaries with less responsibility and experience).
135. See Collingsworth, supra note 22, at 599-600 (recommending that employers factor out
wage differential between employees and instead consider relative productivity).
136. There is considerable danger of exploitation of older workers in this scenario, however.
Workers will be negotiating with their employers as individuals knowing that the alternative to a
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have not generally conducted such vigorous reviews,'37 despite the
prescriptive holdings of Biggins38 and Metz.'39 This failing suggests the
need for additional modifications. These modifications must test the
employer's justification for age animus as well as for age stereotyping.
The modification must enhance the key weakness of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine test as applied to ADEA cases-its inability to detect
age stereotyping. Finally, the modification must recognize that age
stereotyping occurs subconsciously as well as consciously.
B. Recognize the Reasonable Factor Other Than Age Defense
The search for alternatives begins with the statute itself. The statute
includes standards for the employer.' Of these standards, the
"reasonable factor other than age defense" (RFOTA) standard is most
applicable to the salary-age cases. 4 ' Because the RFOTA is an
affirmative defense,'42 the employer would be required to meet a burden
wage reduction is termination. Considering the difficulty that older workers face securing alternate
employment due to age discrimination as well as other labor market factors, these workers may well
accept a wage less than their productivity should dictate. See Harris, supra note 125, at 754 (stating
that requirement that employers offer wage reductions instead of termination, at least where
replacement-worker market provides objective, reliable information regarding cost-productivity
comparison, could enhance danger of wage exploitation; but concluding that danger is not
unchecked).
137. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
138. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
139. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), (2)(A), (2)(B), 3.
141. The BFOQ defense is a narrow, strict defense available to employers with facially
discriminatory policies, such as an age limit for certain jobs. See Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472
U.S. 400,412 (1985). The "good cause" exception simply reaffirms that the ADEA does not protect
older workers from non-discriminatory employment actions justified by usual business concerns. For
an example of an RFOTA, see Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
775 (W.D. Tenn 1979) (recognizing employee strength, dexterity, and stamina as RFOTA justifying
dismissal).
142. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d), (e) (1995) ("When the exception of 'a reasonable factor other than
age' is raised against an individual treatment claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears
the burden of showing that the 'reasonable factor other than age' exists factually."). However, if the
claim raised is a disparate impact claim, then the regulations equate the 'reasonable factor other than
age' standard with the Title VII business necessity standard. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec., 725
F.2d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[The defendant] bears the burden of going forward with evidence to
demonstrate reasonable factors other than age justifying its action."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820
(1984); Criswell v. Western Airlines, 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
400 (1985); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative
Defense: The Reasonable Factor Other than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 197 (1986)
(concluding that RFOTA exception should be construed as affirmative defense).
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of persuasion with its justification. 43 To qualify as a RFOTA the salary
justification could not include age animus or depend on age stereotypes.
Otherwise, the factor is neither reasonable in terms of the ADEA's
purposes nor distinct from age.'" Unless the employer presents evidence
that salary concerns were the basis for the employment action and that
the decision included a review of the individual worker's productivity,
the employer will not survive summary judgment.
Incorporating the RFOTA exception into the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine test would advance the ADEA's anti-animus and anti-
stereotyping goals. The likelihood of a finding of liability for the
employer is higher than under the current test, and, consequently, the
employer has a stronger incentive to offer convincing proof that the
action did not depend on animus or stereotyping. Also, the fact-finder
tests the credibility of the justification directly, instead of relying only on
the plaintiffs showing of pretext to discover motive information
typically within the employer's control. The modification would require
more of the employer who offers salary as a justification and would
penalize the employer who does not examine his or her motives for firing
a highly paid, older worker.
Biggins stressed that age and seniority are analytically distinct, a neat
argument that ignored the degree to which the two factors intertwine in
practice and reminiscent of another intellectually tidy but practically
messy argument advanced to allow distinctions based on pregnancy.
Biggins held that a decision based on seniority is not necessarily based
on age. 45 The Court reasoned that an older worker hired by his or her
employer late in his career might enjoy less seniority than younger co-
workers.' Therefore, age and seniority are unrelated or analytically
distinct.'47 The Court advanced a similar argument, rebuked by Congress
when it passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) 14 in 1978 to
143. See Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering the Discriminatory Motive Requirement in ADEA
Disparate Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 39 (1994) (recognizing differences between Title VII
and ADEA in terms of statutory language and purpose and arguing that couts should incorporate
RFOTA exception into McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test).
144. Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 Toledo L. Rev. 1261, 1278 (1983) (arguing that factors that
are inherently time-based such as tenure and experience cannot be factors other than age).
145. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stai. 2076 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
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clarify Title VII. Prior to passage of the PDA, the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed a disability benefits plan that excluded disabilities based on
pregnancy, holding, in essence, that discrimination based on pregnancy
was not discrimination based on sex.'49 The Court reasoned that because
the insurance plan in question divided individuals into pregnant women
and because non-pregnant people and the latter group included both men
and women, the policy did not discriminate on the basis of sex. 5° Justice
Brennan dissented, stating that "[s]urely it offends common sense to
suggest... that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at the
minimum, strongly 'sex-related."""' Congress agreed with this dissent,
passing the PDA in 1978 to clarify that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy status is discrimination on the basis of sex.'52 Although not all
older workers have seniority, only older workers have seniority of a
certain length, say twenty-five years, just as only women are affected by
pregnancy.53 Thus, a decision based on salary where salary depends on
seniority is, at least, a highly suspicious action triggering an affirmative
defense requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
Modest modifications--to ask employers whether they considered
salary in terms of the productivity of the particular worker and whether
they considered offering the job at a reduced wage-would allow courts
to better test the adequacy of a salary justification. A number of features
of employment actions based on salary support an argument for a more
aggressive modification of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test to place
a burden of persuasion on the employer in the form of the RFOTA
affirmative defense. First, the common incidence of age discrimination
149. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
150. !d. at 135.
151. Id. at 149.
152. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on H.R.
5055 & H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) ("In my view,
such a prohibition [against pregnancy discrimination] was clearly intended in Title VII.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in General Electric versus Gilbert and IUE decided otherwise this
last December."); H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) ("It is the committee's view
that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act... H.R. 6075 was introduced to change the
definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect the commonsense view.").
153. Consider the comments of Sen. Williams: "Such plans which have a negative impact on only
one sex are, by definition, discriminatory." Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977:
Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong, Ist Sess. 1 (1977) (remarks of Chairman Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.).
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cases based on salary and the general unwillingness of courts to
rigorously review the employer's salary justification under current
doctrine call for greater scrutiny. Second, the employer's, salary motive
may have rested upon stereotypes that consistently eluded detection by a
test primed to detect animus. Finally, an action based on salary where
salary depends on seniority is suspicious and requires that an employer
assert an affirmative defense.
Age discrimination operates differently than does discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. 54 Congress recognized these diffirences, noting
that age discrimination stemmed more frequently from inaccurate
stereotyping than from animus, and constructed a statute with exceptions
not found in Title VII 55 Notwithstanding these differences, Title VII
tools, including the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test, have been used in
age discrimination cases.'56 Not surprisingly, the transplant has been less
than completely successful. The ADEA itself provides a solution and
courts should require that employers meet the statutory standard of the
RFOTA exception.
154. See Secretary's Report, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 2, at
22.
155. Supra note 21.
156. Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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